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THE ROLE OF ABANDONMENT IN
THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
AN APPLICATION OF MISDIRECTED EMPHASIS
EDWARD G. MASCOLO*
INTRODUCTION
W ith the evolvement of an increasingly urban culture and
civilization, law enforcement agencies in the United States
have been faced with problems of major proportions. Although
only some of these problems are of recent vintage, they all have
been magnified by the acute density of population in our urban
centers. Accompanying this shift in population emphasis has been
a growing frequency in street encounters between the police and
the citizen. These encounters "are incredibly rich in diversity"'
and pregnant with potential confrontation.
Since our society has chosen to reserve to the people all power
not required for effective rule under a government of laws, we have
deemed it necessary to safeguard "the right of every individual to
the possession and control of his own person, free from all re-
straint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law."2
The foundation of this policy is the fourth amendment,8
having as its essence the protection against arbitrary intrusions by
government into the privacies of life.4 Thus, while a police officer
must be vigilant and resourceful in combating crime, he is re-
quired to do so within a constitutional framework that seeks the
preservation of the dignity of the individual.
* Member of the Connecticut and District of Columbia Bars; Editor-in-Chief of the
CONNECricuT BAR JOURNAr. B.A., Wesleyan University, 1949; LL.B., Georgetown Univer-
sity, 1952.
1. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
2. Union Pac. R.R. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
3. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
4. Texas v. Gonzales, 388 F.2d 145, 147-48 (5th Cir. 1968).
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Since encounters between the police and the individual are
varied and unpredictable, no a priori ground rules for analysis are
feasible. Each encounter will require separate examination, taking
into consideration the surrounding circumstances. However, they
will usually fall into three major categories: those of a chance
variety; those initiated by the police; and those effected through
the execution of either search or arrest warrants., In each, the
ultimate result may be the same: the individual encountered dis-
cards a piece of incriminating evidence which is retrieved by the
officer. The issue raised, then, is whether the disclosure of the
evidence was the product of, and was prompted by, unreasonable
activity under the fourth amendment, thereby necessitating its
suppression under the exclusionary rule," or was the result of an
act of abandonment lying beyond the protection of the amend-
ment.
The resolution of this issue will hinge, in turn, on a number
of variables: the type of encounter involved; its locale; the identity
and motivation of its prompter; and the initial legality of an
officer's presence prior to the confrontation. It is to this issue, and
its surrounding variables, that this article is directed. An attempt
will be made to categorize the several authorities passing upon
this issue, to critically analyze, where appropriate, their attempted
solutions, and to propose a new approach for the effective solution
of an increasingly frequent problem of constitutional importance.
I. THE MEANING OF ABANDONMENT AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
IN THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The significance of abandoned property in the law of search
and seizure lies in the maxim that the protection of the fourth
amendment does not extend to it. 7 Thus, where one abandons
property, he is said to bring his right of privacy therein to an end,8
and may not later complain about its subsequent seizure and use
5. The first two categories will usually involve public confrontations, whereas the
last will frequently arise in private.
6. The exclusionary rule is essential to the fourth amendment. E.g., Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968) ; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
7. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960); Moss v. Cox, 311 F. Supp. 1245,
1249 (E.D. Va. 1970); Jackson v. State, 235 So. 2d 382, 385 (Ala. Crim. App. 1970);
People v. Prisco, 61 Misc. 2d 730, 733, 305 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 1010 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
8. Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1, 7 (9th Cir. 1966); see United States v.
Gibson, 421 F.2d 662, 663 (5th Cir. 1970).
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in evidence against himY In short, the theory of abandonment is
that no issue of search is presented in such a situation, 0 and the
property so abandoned may be seized without probable cause.11
It is readily apparent, then, that the issue of abandonment in
criminal prosecutions cannot be resolved solely on the basis of its
concept in the law of property, where the dual issues of incrimina-
tion and constitutional protection are primarily irrelevant. This
is not to say, however, that its property law meaning is without
significance in the field of search and seizure. What it does signify
is that before a court may properly find abandonment in a criminal
prosecution, it must take into consideration not only the property
law concept of abandonment but also the issue of waiver of a basic
constitutional protection. Thus, abandonment in the law of search
and seizure is relevant to the voluntary relinquishment of a known
right.' 2
When the issue of abandonment is raised in a criminal pro-
ceeding, the initial point of inquiry for a court should be directed
toward the concept that has evolved with the development of
property law. Although this concept is not controlling on the
issue of abandonment in the law of search and seizure, it is a point
of reference because it defines the property aspect of 'the issue.
From this, a court should then proceed to the remaining, and
critical, constitutional aspect, which determines whether the indi-
vidual's activities had the effect of intentional and voluntary termi-
nation of his right of privacy in the property discarded. Thus, the
issue of abandonment under the fourth amendment is composed
of the dual qualities of property and privacy.
In the law of property, it has been recognized that the act of
abandonment is demonstrated by an intention to relinquish all
title, possession, or claim to property, accompanied by some type
9. United States ex rel. Fein v. Deegan, 298 F. Supp. 359, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd
on other grounds, 410 F.2d 13 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 935 (1969); People v.
Prisco, 61 Misc. 2d 730, 733, 305 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 1010 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
10. Jackson v. State, 235 So. 2d 382, 385 (Ala. Crim. App. 1970); People v. Lopez,
22 App. Div. 2d 813, 254 N.Y.S.2d 806 (2d Dep't 1964); People v. Prisco, 61 Misc. 2d
730, 733, 305 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 1010 (Sup. Ct. 1969); see United States v. Gibson, 421 F.2d
662, 663 (5th Cir. 1970).
11. Moss v. Cox, 311 F. Supp. 1245, 1249 (E.D. Va. 1970) (rule applies, provided
either that the area of abandonment is accessible to the public, or itself has been
abandoned, or where the aggrieved party lacks the requisite standing to complain).
12. Which, of course, is the meaning of "waiver." E.g., Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S.
1, 4 (1966); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); United States v. Blalock, 255F.
Supp. 268, 269-70 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
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of activity or omission by which such intention is manifested. 8
As one court has stated:
The abandonment of property is the relinquishing of all title, pos-
session, or claim to or of it- a virtual intentional throwing away
of it. It is not presumed. Proof supporting it must be direct or
affirmative or reasonably beget the exclusive inference of the
throwing away.14
It is ordinarily a question of fact,; is never presumed,16 and
does not require the performance of any ritual. 1 Ultimately, it is
a question of intent.'s Since, however, the conclusive effect of
abandonment under the fourth amendment is the termination of
an individual's right, or expectation, of privacy in a particular
piece of property, its existence is finally a question of federal con-
stitutional law, and not one governed by local property concepts. 0
II. STANDING AND BURDEN OF PROOF
A. Standing
In view of the fact that whenever an individual discards per-
sonal property, he runs the potential risk of exposing himself to a
claim of abandonment 2 which, if proved, will divest him of any
13. Glotzer v. Keyes, 125 Conn. 227, 233, 5 A.2d 1, 4 (1939); Boatman v. Andre,
44 Wyo. 352, 362, 12 P.2d 370, 373 (1932). For example, if an individual throws away
objects in a public alley, they will be considered abandoned. People v. Prisco, 61 Misc.
2d 730, 733, 305 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 1010 (Sup. Ct. 1969). And, where a hotel guest vacates
his room and checks out, any items of personal property voluntarily left behind will be
classified as abandoned. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960); People v. Long,
86 Cal. Rptr. 227, 231 (Ct. App., 2d Dist. 1970).
14. Foulke v. New York Consol. R.R., 228 N.Y. 269, 127 N.E. 237, 238 (1920)
(emphasis added), quoted with approval in United States v. Cowan, 396 F.2d 83, 87 (2d
Cir. 1968). In view of this, the intentional concealment of property is not an act of
abandonment. See State v. Chapman, 250 A.2d 203, 212 (Me. 1969).
15. Sharkiewicz v. Lepone, 139 Conn. 706, 707, 96 A.2d 796, 797 (1953).
16. Foulke v. New York Consol. R.R., 228 N.Y. 269, 127 N.E. 237, 238 (1920). Of
interest is the related rule governing the waiver of constitutional rights, namely, the pre-
sumption against such waiver. E.g., Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966).
17. United States v. Cowan, 396 F.2d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1968).
18. Id.
19. United States ex rel. Fein v. Deegan, 298 F. Supp. 359, 365 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
aff'd on other grounds, 410 F.2d 13 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 935 (1969). It has
also been recognized that rights secured by the fourth amendment are not governed by
local property law. E.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); see Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266-67 (1960).
20. There is also the risk that the discarded property will fall within the "plain
view" doctrine, in which event no issue of search is presented. For representative ex-
amples of such an approach, see Burton v. United States, 414 F.2d 261, 263 (5th Cir.
1969) ; People v. Sylvester, 43 II. 2d 325, 327, 253 N.E.2d 429, 430 (1969); People v.
Bridges, 123 Ill. App. 2d 58, -, 259 N.E.2d 626, 629 (1st Dist. 1970); People v. Rice, 122
Ill. App. 2d 329, -, 258 N.E.2d 841, 843 (4th Dist. 1970); Dansby v. State, 450 S.W.2d
338, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
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interest therein, the question naturally arises whether such dis-
card deprives him of the requisite standing to complain. Although
rarely discussed in the cases, the answer appears to be that the
disposal of the property will not undercut the individual's right
to complain.2
There is merit in this approach. First, abandonment is never
presumed. Therefore, if the act of discard were to sever an accused's
standing to complain, it would nullify the rule of non-presumption
and would, in fact, effectively reverse it in favor of presumption.
Second, the Supreme Court has rejected the requirements of owner-
ship and possessory interest for standing.22
B. Burden of Proof
By its very nature, the issue of abandonment will arise only in
situations involving warrantless activity, for otherwise, the prosecu-
tion would seek justification in the authority conferred by a war-
rant. Therefore, the question of burden of proof will be deter-
mined by reference to the rule pertaining to warrantless searches
or seizures.
As with consent, 23 the burden rests with the prosecution to
justify either a warrantless arrest 24 or search.2 5 Thus, although the
accused initially carries the burden of establishing warrantless
activity,26 once he has succeeded in this, the burden will shift to
21. E.g., Moss v. Cox, 311 F. Supp. 1245, 1249, 1250 (E.D. Va. 1970). The court
reasoned that if a consent to search is invalid because it consists of no more than mere
acquiescence to official demands, the discarding of property in the face of "impending
discovery" should not preclude subsequent objection to the legality of official conduct
which prompted such action. Id. at 1249. To deny standing to an individual so situated,
reasoned the court, would be to indulge in a "fiction" and would effectively preclude
access to exclusion, which is "aimed at official improprieties." Id. Although the situation
in Moss dealt with imminent discovery, no sound reason appears to limit the rule to
that situation, and the rule annouced should apply to any discard. Otherwise, a court
will be deprived of the opportunity to ascertain the true factual situation.
22. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 263-64, 267 (1960).
23. E.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968); People v. Whitehurst,
25 N.Y.2d 389, 391, 254 N.E.2d 905, 906, 306 N.Y.S.2d 673, 674 (1969).
24. People v. Williams, 88 Cal. Rptr. 349, 351 (Ct. App., 2d Dist. 1970); see Beck
v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964); People v. Satterfield, 252 Cal. App. 2d 270, 275, 60
Cal. Rptr. 733, 737 (1st Dist. 1967).
25. People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 1099, 458 P.2d 713, 715, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633,
635 (1969); People v. Faris, 63 Cal. 2d 541, 545, 407 P.2d 282, 285, 47 Cal. Rptr. 370, 373
(1965); State v. Keeby, 159 Conn. 201, 206, 268 A.2d 652, 655 (1970).
26. The law presumes the existence of a warrant. People v. Lyons, 87 Cal. Rptr.
799, 801 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
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the prosecution to show proper justification for the challenged
police conduct."
III. AUTHORITIES FINDING ABANDONMENT
It is now appropriate to summarize the differing rationale of
the cases finding abandonment or reasonable seizure. Critical anal-
ysis will follow.
Abandonment, being primarily a question of fact, must be
resolved in terms of the circumstances surrounding the act of dis-
card. Among the circumstances used by courts are the nature of the
locale where the individual is observed in the act of discard; the
area into which the property is thrown; the behavior (pattern) of
the individual; and the propriety of the retrieving or seizing
officer's conduct both prior to and at the moment of discard.
In the leading case of Hester v. United States,8 Mr. Justice
Holmes, speaking for the Court, held that since petitioner had
been observed in the act of discarding property in an open field,
it was proper for the officers to retrieve it, as it had been abandoned,
and the protection accorded by the fourth amendment does not
extend to the "open fields."2 9
It has also been held that if an individual, while under either
observation or active surveillance by the police, but not under
arrest, discards an object in a public area upon becoming cognizant
of their presence, it will be considered abandoned. 0 State courts
27. Id.; People v. Whitehurst, 25 N.Y.2d 389, 391, 254 N.E.2d 905, 906, 306
N.Y.S.2d 673, 674 (1969). It has been explicitly recognized that the burden rests with
the prosecution to establish abandonment. E.g., United States v. Robinson, 430 F.2d
1141, 1143 (6th Cir. 1970).
28. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
29. Id. at 58, 59. It is not clear whether the primary basis for the court's decision
was abandonment or the "open fields" doctrine. If the former, then there would have
been no need to justify the seizure under the doctrine; if the latter, then there would
have been no necessity for characterizing the property as "abandoned." It would appear,
however, that the locus of the discard had a bearing on the court's determination of
abandonment, thereby requiring a dual basis for its decision, because it further noted
that the evidence had not been obtained by entry into petitioner's residence, and the
examination of the discarded property took place in an open field. Id.
30. Vincent v. United States, 337 F.2d 891, 897 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 988 (1965); Burton v. United States, 272 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 951 (1960); People v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. Rptr. 712, 714 (Dist. Ct. App.
1969); Brown v. United States, 261 A.2d 834, 835 (D.C. App. 1970); People v. Bridges,
123 Ill. App. 2d 58,-, 259 N.E.2d 626, 629 (1st Dist. 1970).
404
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have reached the same conclusion where the discard is effected
while the individual is being lawfully detained for questioning, 1
or while the police are approaching him for such inquiry.32
Other cases addressing the abandonment issue have placed
primary emphasis upon the type of area into which the property
is thrown. Thus, in United States v. Lewis,33 the court reasoned
that since defendant had no constitutionally protected right of
privacy in either an apartment roof from which a federal agent
observed her toss out a package of heroin from her window, or the
courtyard where it landed, she could not complain of any invasion
of privacy.3 4 And, in Hobson v. United States," the court argued
that one of the reasons why the contents of the discarded bag of
heroin should have been suppressed was that it had landed within
the curtilage of defendant's home-an area protected under the
fourth amendment.3 6 From this line of reasoning has evolved the
rule that if an individual, in response to the lawful presence of
law enforcement officers, discards property in an area lying outside
the protective ambit of the fourth amendment, no issue of un-
reasonable search or seizure activity will be presented.3 7
A third line of cases has attached critical importance to the
defendant's conduct, and has argued that if he divests himself of
the property out of any consciousness of guilt, or because of a fear
of potential apprehension, it will be reasonable for a police officer
to retrieve it.33
31. Martinez v. People, 456 P.2d 275, 277 (Colo. 1969); Dansby v. State, 450
S.W.2d 338, 339 (rex. Grim. App. 1970).
32. People v. Blackmon, 80 Cal. Rptr. 862, 864 (Ct. App., 2d Dist. 1969) (relying
in part upon defendant's strong sense of guilt); Hardin v. State, 257 N.E.2d 671, 672-73
(Ind. 1970); Branning v. State, 222 So. 2d 667, 669 (Miss. 1969); see McGuire v. State, 468
P.2d 12, 14 (Nev. 1970).
33. 227 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
34. Id. at 436.
35. 226 F.2d 890 (8th Cir. 1955).
36. Id. at 894.
37. Fletcher v. Wainwright, 399 F.2d 62, 64 (5th Cir. 1968), interpreting Marullo v.
United States, 328 F.2d 361, 363, 364 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 330 F.2d 609, cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 850 (1964); Trujillo v. United States, 294 F.2d 583, 583-84 (10th Cir.
1961); see Lee v. United States, 221 F.2d 29, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Branning v. State, 222
So. 2d 667, 669 (Miss. 1969); State v. Garcia, 76 N.M. 171, 175, 413 P.2d 210, 213 (1966).
38. United States v. Martin, 386 F.2d 213, 215 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 862 (1968); United States v. McKethan, 247 F. Supp. 324, 328 (D.D.C. 1965), aff'd.
by order, No. 20,059 (D.C. Cir. 1966); People v. Blackmon, 80 Cal. Rptr. 862, 864 (Ct.
App., 2d Dist. 1969); State v. Shaw, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 17, 19, 262 A.2d 614, 615 (Tr. Div.
1968) (court ruled that defendant had abandoned property out of fear of apprehension).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The final line of cases approaches the issue with emphasis
upon the reasonableness of police activity, and has reasoned that
if no improper activity or presence by law enforcement officers
prompts an individual to discard incriminating evidence, then it
may not be said that its exposure was the product of either an
illegal arrest or search and seizure.3 9 A further rule states that if an
accused discards property while in lawful custody or detention, or
while peace officers are attempting to effect such custody, it may be
lawfully retrieved.4 0
Since it may not always be readily perceivable whether the
actions of law enforcement officers have prompted an accused to
discard items of evidentiary interest, it has been suggested that the
test is what "a reasonable man, innocent of any crime, would have
thought, had he been in the defendant's shoes. "41
IV. AUTHORITIES NOT FINDING ABANDONMENT
The basis for the cases not finding abandonment appears to
be threefold: either the discard was prompted by the unlawful
presence of the police, was the product of an illegal arrest, or was
39. Capitoli v. Wainwright, 426 F.2d 868, 870 (5th Cir. 1970); Cutchlow v. United
States, 301 F.2d 295, 297 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v. McKethan, 247 F. Supp. 324,
328-29 (D.D.C. 1965), aff'd by order, No, 20,059 (D.C. Cir. 1966); United States v. Lewis,
227 F. Supp. 433, 436-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (also endorsing the locale doctrine); United
States v. Festa, 192 F. Supp. 160, 165 (D. Mass. 1960) (dictum); State v. Everidge, 77
N.M. 505, 511-12, 424 P.2d 787, 792 (1967); State v. Romeo, 43 N.J. 188, 205-06, 203
A.2d 23, 32 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 970 (1965); see Fletcher v. Wainwright, 399
F.2d 62, 64 (5th Cir. 1968) (existence of rule recognized); United States v. Merritt, 293
F.2d 742, 744-46 (3d Cir. 1961); Haerr v. United States, 240 F.2d 533, 535 (5th Cir.
1957) (by implication). One case has even gone so far as to hold that police officers may
validly seize abandoned property after gaining illegal entry to private premises, pro.
vided they did not force the discard by means of exploitation of their entry. United
States v. Martin, 386 F.2d 213, 215 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 893 U.S. 862 (1968).
40. Capitoli v. Wainwright, 426 F.2d 868, 870 (5th Cir. 1970); Burton v. United
States, 414 F.2d 261, 263 (5th Cir. 1969); People v. Sylvester, 43 Ill. 2d 325, 326-27,
253 N.E.2d 429, 430 (1969) (such property will be considered abandoned); Von Hauger
v. State, 258 N.E.2d 847, 848 (Ind. 1970); Oliver v. State, 449 P.2d 252, 253 (Nev. 1969)
(will be considered abandoned); People v. McKnight, 26 N.Y.2d 1034, 260 N.E.2d 552,
311 N.Y.S.2d 922, 923 (1970); Jackson v. State, 235 So. 2d 382, 385 (Ala. Crim. App. 1970);
see Johnson v. United States, 370 F.2d 489, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Hayes v. State, 44 Ala.
Grim. App. 539,-, 215 So. 2d 604, 606 (1968); Maples v. State, 44 Ala. Crim. App. 491,
-, 214 So. 2d 700, 703 (1968); Hamilton v. State, 438 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Tex. Grim. App.
1969); Parson v .State, 432 S.W.2d 89, 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) King v. State, 416
S.W.2d 823, 824 (Tex. Grim. App. 1967).
41. United States v. McKethan, 247 F. Supp. 324, 328 (D.D.C. 1965), aff'd by order,
No. 20,059 (D.C. Cir. 1966). This approach, it is submitted, is unrealistic, for the
obvious reason that there would be nothing for an innocent man to discard.
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performed under circumstances demonstrating a continued ex-
pectation of privacy.
The main element of distinction between these cases and
those finding abandonment appears to lie in the primary emphasis
placed upon the activities of the police. Thus, in Fletcher v. Wain-
wright,42 the court ruled that since defendants discarded stolen
jewelry from their motel window in response to an unlawful at-
tempt by the police to gain entry to their room, no true abandon-
ment had been intended.43 "To hold otherwise would abort the
deterrent policy behind the exclusionary rule." 4 Furthermore, the
court specifically rejected the principle that defendants could not
complain for lack of a proprietary interest in the area where the
jewelry was retrieved, on the ground that the proprietary-interest
approach clouded the issues of privacy and public security, which
should be the focal points of any inquiry under the fourth amend-
ment.45
From this primary emphasis upon the legality of law enforce-
ment activity has evolved the rule that if an individual discards or
throws away evidence as a direct consequence of the unlawful
presence of peace officers, his act will not be considered a volun-
tary abandonment, but rather a forced response to the unauthor-
ized presence.46 Therefore, the fact that the discard openly reveals
42. 399 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1968).
43. Id. at 64.
44. Id. at 64-65.
45. Id. at 64. As the Supreme Court has said:
The premise that property interests control the right of the Government to
search and seize has been discredited. * * * We have recognized that the
principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather
than property, and have increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers
rested on property concepts.
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 804 (1967).
46. Fletcher v. Wainwright, 399 F.2d 62, 64 (5th Cir. 1968); Massachusetts v.
Painten, 368 F.2d 142, 144 (Ist Cir. 1966), petition for cert. dismissed, 389 U.S. 560,
561 (1968); United States v. Merritt, 293 F.2d 742, 744-46 (3d Cir. 1961); Work v. United
States, 243 F.2d 660, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (hiding narcotics in a trash can to avoid
detection is not abandonment); Hobson v. United States, 226 F.2d 890, 894 (8th Cir.
1955); Ingram v. State, 226 So. 2d 169, 171 (Ala. App. 1969); see Von Utter v. Tulloch,
426 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir, 1970). Conversely, if the discard is prompted out of a sense of
guilt, and not as a result of exploitation of the illegal entry, then there will be an
abandonment. E.g., United States v. Martin, 386 F.2d 213, 215 (3d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 862 (1968). Although these cases dealt with entry upon private premises,
this element of situs should have no constitutional significance, as the crucial issue was
one of intent: did the accused intend to permanently abandon the property, or was
his intent one of only temporary divestment? Additionally, the Supreme Court has
emphasized that the fourth amendment "protects people, not places." Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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the nature of the property will not alter the result so as to permit
seizure under the "open view" doctrine. 7
Closely allied to this situation is the one involving an illegal
arrest. Here, too, the discard will not be considered voluntary if it
was prompted by the attempted or executed illegal seizure of
defendant.48 The reasoning behind the refusal to find abandon-
ment in these cases is that since there has been an illegal arrest,
there can be no abandonment as a matter of law, because the "pri-
mary illegality would taint the [purported] abandonment ... .
Occasionally, a court, when faced with the issue of abandon-
ment, will be concerned primarily with the owner's continued ex-
pectation of privacy in the discarded property, rather than with
illegal official presence or activity. In this situation, the court's
inquiry will be directed to whether the disposal of the property
was intended as a special, or a general, act of abandonment; that
is to say, did the owner, by the manner of disposal, intend an
abandonment to the world, or only to a special class of individuals?
Thus, in People v. Edwards," the court held that a bag of mari-
juana, placed in a trash can several feet from the back porch door
of defendants' residence prior to their knowledge of any police pres-
ence, was not abandoned.51 It reasoned that in putting the bag in
the can, defendants had exhibited a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy from the rest of the world, with the exception of trashmen
authorized to remove the receptacle's contents, and at least until
the trash had lost its identity and significance (meaning) by later
47. Ingram v. State, 226 So. 2d 169, 171 (Ala. App. 1969). The doctrine does not
apply if the officer is illegally positioned or situated. Amador-Gonzales v. United States,
391 F.2d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 1968); Ingram v. State, supra at 171.
48. Williams v. United States, 237 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Moss v. Cox, 811
F. Supp. 1245, 1253 (E.D. Va. 1970); United States v. Festa, 192 F. Supp. 160, 165 (D.
Mass. 1960); People v. Baldwin, 25 N.Y.2d 66, 70, 250 N.E.2d 62, 64, 302 N.Y.S.2d 571,
574 (1969) (noting that the mere dropping of an envelope is insufficient to establish
probable cause, id. at 71, 250 N.E.2d at 64, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 574; see Rios v. United
States, 364 U.S. 253, 262 n.6 (1960)); Buse v. State, 435 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1968) (rehearing denied, 1969) ; see Rios v. United States, supra at 261.62.
49. People v. Baldwin, 25 N.Y.2d 66, 70, 250 N.E.2d 62, 64, 302 N.Y.S.2d 571, 574
(1969).
50. 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
51. Id. at 1106, 458 P.2d at 718, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
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becoming part of a large conglomeration of trash elsewhere." And
in State v. Chapman 3 the court ruled that a bottle deposited in a
trash barrel located in a garage on private premises was not aban-
doned.5 4 It reasoned that since the bottle had been positioned well
down in the barrel and covered with paper and trash, this strongly
suggested that it had been intentionally concealed there, rather
than abandoned. 55
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDED PROPOSALS
A. Introductory Matters
1. Hester v. United States and the "Open Fields" Doctrine
Permeating the whole issue of abandonment under the fourth
amendment is the landmark case of Hester v. United States,5 6 and
the "open fields" doctrine which it espoused. The facts were rela-
tively simple. After receiving certain information, revenue officers
proceeded without warrant toward Hester's home, a residence
belonging to his father.5 7 As they approached the house, they ob-
served one Henderson drive up. Positioning themselves some 50
to 100 yards distant, the officers saw Hester come out of the house
and hand Henderson a quart bottle. Thereupon, an alarm was
sounded, Hester seized a gallon jug from a nearby car, and both
he and Henderson fled. One of the officers gave chase, and fired his
pistol. Hester dropped the jug, which, although it broke, managed
to retain approximately a quart of its contents. Henderson, who
52. Id. The court particularly felt that a person's trash is his own business, to
bc free from the rummaging of neighbors and others, from which might flow half-
truths leading to idle gossip and rumor. Id. A somewhat contrary approach was adopted
in Marullo v. United States, 328 F.2d 361 (5th Car.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 850 (1964),
where the court argued that a motel occupant had no right of privacy in the top of a
brick pillar supporting the motel cabin, so as to preserve from offidal inquiry any
item placed there for safekeeping. 328 F.2d at 364. In Marullo, the court expressly
endoried, by way of dictum, Judge Burger's dissent in Work v. United States, 243 F.2d
660 (D.C. Cir. 1957), that there is no constitutional right of privacy in a trash can.
Marullo v. United States, supra at 363.
53. 250 A.2d 203 (Me. 1969).
54. Id. at 212.
55. Id.
56. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
57. The opinion was silent as to the nature of the information. However, since the
court did not attempt to justify the officers' actions on the basis of probable cause, it
is reasonably safe to assume that at the time of their arrival, they did not possess prob-
able cause to arrest.
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was also carrying a bottle, proceeded to discard it. The officer re-
trieved both the jug and the bottle and recognized their contents
as "moonshine" whiskey.
Meanwhile, the other officer, who had entered the house and
left after being advised that there was no whiskey there, discovered
outside a jar of whiskey that had been tossed out.
The crucial issue5s raised was whether the seized receptacles
were the product of an illegal search or seizure. In rejecting the
claim of unreasonable conduct under the fourth amendment, the
Court reasoned that the defendant's own acts, as well as those of
his associates, had disclosed the receptacles, and that their contents
could be retrieved without regard to the amendment, as they had
been abandoned.59 Furthermore, it argued that the commission of
a trespass by the officers would not require the suppression of the
evidence, noting that there had been an abandonment, and that
the evidence had not been seized within the house.0°
The Court did not stop there, however, but took the oppor-
tunity to adoptively apply the "open fields" doctrine to the fourth
amendment. Claiming that the only ground for review arose from
the fact that the contents of the receptacles had been examined on
the land of Hester's father, the Court ruled that this was without
constitutional significance, as the protective ambit of the fourth
amendment did not extend "to the open fields."' It concluded, in
reliance upon Blackstone, 2 that the distinction between the home
and the open fields was "as old as the common law. '0 3
The Court's reasoning can be faulted on several scores. First,
its reliance upon Blackstone was completely misplaced. The pas-
sages therein cited dealt with a discussion of common law burglary,
a crime which has never had any historical relevance to the fourth
amendment. In his discussion, Sir William pointed out the heinous
58. The contention that defendant was compelled to incriminate himself as a
reaction to the officers' actions was summarily dismissed without comment. 265 U.S. at
58-59.
59. Id. at 58. Consequently, the case has been interpreted as involving no issue
of search under the fourth amendment. E.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 465 (1928).
60. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924).
61. Id. at 59. This pronouncement has been recognized as the first instance of
the doctrine's application to the law of search and seizure. E.g. United States v.
Watt, 309 F. Supp. 329, 330 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
62. E.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 223, 225, 226.
63. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
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nature of burglary and recognized the peculiar sanctity of the
home.(4 He then proceeded to discuss the particular places where
burglary could and could not be committed; but the basis for the
distinction of situs was predicated upon the presence or absence
of the element of "midnight terror."65 Thus, in rejecting certain
places as lying outside the ambit of burglary, Sir William observed:
And therefore we may safely conclude that the requisite of its
being domus mansionalis [the mansion house] is only in the bur-
glary of a private house [as contrasted with a church or the walls
and gates of a town], which is the most frequent, and in which it
is indispensably necessary, to form its guilt, that it must be in a
mansion-or dwelling-house. For no distant barn, warehouse, or the
like are under the same privileges, nor looked upon as a man's
castle of defence; nor is a breaking open of houses wherein no
man resides, and which therefore for the time-being are not man-
sion-houses, attended with the same circumstances of midnight
terror.60
The attempt, then, to correlate the existence or absence of
protection under the fourth amendment to the situs of either pri-
vate or official activity is not only historically erroneous, but also
illogical.67 It would have the effect of making the right to privacy
purely transitory, without regard to the issue of waiver. It would
extend the right to the individual within his home, while with-
holding it once he steps foot outside. It would make the right
ambulatory and not permanent, and would make places, rather
than people, the focal point of fourth amendment inquiry.08 Since,
64. 4 W. BLcKSONE, COMMENTARIES * 223.
65. Id. at 225.
66. Id. If an attempt were made to historically connect common law burglary
with the law of search and seizure, the results would be quite bizarre. For example,
since burglary at the common law could be committed only at night, id. at 223, 224-25,
there could be no condemnation of unreasonable daytime searches or seizures.
That the existence of unreasonable search-and-seizure activity is no longer predi-
cated on historical support cannot be doubted. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Berger v. United States, 388 U.S. 41, 51 (1967). See Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 486 (1963).
67. It has been recognized that the rationale of Hester may not be harmonized
with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). There the Court rejected the concept
of constitutionally protected areas and embraced the principle that "the Fourth Amend-
ment protects people, not places." Id. at 351. Accord, e.g., ALI MODEL CODE OF PaR-
ARRAIGMN ENT PaocEDuR, Commentary on Article 6, at 81 (rent. Draft No. 3, 1970). For
a recommended modification of the "open fields" doctrine, see id. at § SS 6.04.
68. "The focus in Fourth Amendment cases today is on privacy rather than on
property rights." Brett v. United States, 412 F.2d 401, 406 (5th Cir. 1969); accord,
Faubion v. United States, 424 F.2d 437, 440 (10th Cir. 1970).
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however, the amendment protects people, and not simply areas,"0
it follows that wherever the individual harbors a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy, without regard to the public or private nature
of the situs of his presence, he is entitled to be free from un-
reasonable governmental intrusion.70
The Court's contention in Hester that the issue of trespass
was without constitutional significance is also subject to criticism.
It brushed aside the issue without inquiry into the purpose of the
officers' presence. It blinded itself to the obvious fact that the
officers entered upon the premises for the purpose of search,7' and
silently endorsed their right to do so without regard to the exist-
ence of probable cause. 72 By doing so, it rejected the principle that
if a law enforcement officer's primary purpose is to search, then
he will not be permitted to enter upon private "open lands" in
the absence of probable cause.73
69. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
70. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). Conversely, one will lose the protection of
the amendment if he knowingly exposes property is his home to the public. Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
71. Unquestionably, search is a functional process, Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S.
74, 78 (1949) ; and, the searcher must have in mind some particular evidence he is seek-
ing. United States v. Tate, 209 F. Supp. 762, 765 (D.C. Del. 1962). Hester and his con-
federates seemed to indicate by their actions that they were cognizant of these factors.
72. As a result of this permissiveness, a number of courts have espoused the doctrine
that a simple trespass will not per se invalidate a subsequent search or seizure. E.g.,
United States v. Romano, 330 F.2d 566, 569 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 942
(1965); United States v. Lewis, 227 F. Supp. 433, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); People v. Terry,
70 Cal. 2d 410, 426, 454 P.2d 36, 48, 77 Cal. Rptr. 460, 472 (1969); Commonwealth v.
Dolan, 352 Mass. 432, 433, 225 N.E.2d 910, 911 (1967); State v. Brown, 89 Ore. Adv. Sh.
741, -, 461 P.2d 836, 838 (Ore. App. 1969). In Brown, the court did acknowledge, how-
ever, that evidence suppressed as the product of a trespass is that uncovered as a result
of an intrusion that inherently seeks to pry into hidden places for something that has
been intentionally concealed. Id.
73. E.g., ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § SS 6.04 (Tent. Draft
No. 3, 1970). See also Texas v. Gonzales, 388 F.2d 145, 147, 148 (5th Cir. 1968); Brock
v. United States, 223 F.2d 681, 685 (5th Cir. 1955). Although these cases premised their
holdings on the theory that there had been an actual intrusion into a protected zone of
privacy, Texas v. Gonzales, supra at 148, they would appear to be equally supportable
under the "expectation-of-privacy" doctrine announced in Katz. For example, in State
v. Dias, 470 P.2d 510 (Hawaii 1970), the court ruled that a group of individuals meeting
and socializing in a passageway located on private property between two buildings were
entitled to "every expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion as to the prem-
ises," even though the members might have been trespassers. Id. at 514. Accordingly, it
held that observations of the group made with the aid of binoculars by a police officer
stationed some 150 to 200 yards distant could not form the basis for a warrantless search
of the passageway. Such intrusion could only be sanctioned under the authority of a
warrant. Id. at 515. And in Kirby v. Superior Court, 87 Cal. Rptr. 577 (Ct. App., 2d
Dept. 1970), the court recognized that observations made by a police officer of an indi-
vidual in a locale where the latter has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy may
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Finally, the Court was unrealistic in characterizing the dis-
carded receptacles as "abandoned." In doing so, it literally pre-
sumed the existence of abandonment from the mere act of discard
without regard to the realities of the situation, and without a
demand for affirmative proof demonstrating an intentional desire
on the part of Hester to permanently relinquish all title or claim
to the property. The Court made its determination on the sole
basis of Hester's reaction to the officers' presence, and irrespective
of his intent. The net result, then, was a baseless conclusion of
the existence of a legal concept in clear disregard of its basic
premise.
2. The Curtilage Doctrine
Closely allied to the "open fields" doctrine is the concept of
the "curtilage" 4-a concept that is both physical and constitutional.
The physical limits of the curtilage are generally defined to be the
ground and buildings in the immediate area surrounding a dwell-
ing.
The constitutional significance of the concept lies in the fact
that the protection afforded by the fourth amendment, while not
reaching to the open fields, does extend to the curtilage so as to
include open areas immediately adjacent to a private home.7 6
Thus, the differentiation between an immediately adjacent area
falling within the ambit of the amendment and an unprotected
open field has usually been analyzed in terms of the limits of the
constitute an unreasonable search. Id. at 579. Thus, if the officer was present without
authority of a warrant, and if it was reasonable for the individual to expect privacy,
and had exhibited such expectation, the observations could be unreasonable. Id.
If it may be argued that in Hester the defendant had not exhibited any reasonable
expectation of privacy, it can be claimed with equal logic that he had exhibited as much
as could be expected under the circumstances. After all, he resided on the premises, and
he had no way of knowing of the officers' presence. Therefore, it cannot be seriously
contended that he knowingly exposed the receptacles to their view. See Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Although the defendant in Hester did reveal the jug
from its place of concealment within the car, he did so only after an alarm was given.
Hence, rather than being a voluntary disclosure, it was actually a reaction to the officers'
unauthorized presence.
74. It might be said that the former literally commences where the latter terminates.
See United States v. Campbell, 395 F.2d 848 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 393 U.S. 834 (1968);
United States v. Watt, 309 F. Supp. 329, 330 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
75. Rosencranz v. United States, 356 F.2d 310, 313 (1st Cir. 1966). As originally
conceived, it was an area usually enclosed by some fence or barrier. Id.
76. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928); United States ex rel.
Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.gd 896, 899 (3d Cir. 1968); Wattenburg v. United States, 388
F.2d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 1968).
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curtilage. 77 The curtilage, then, sets the fourth amendment bound-
aries that may not be officially invaded without probable cause.78 It
is in this regard that the curtilage doctrine is relevant to the issue
of abandonment, for if evidence is thrown out of a private residence
in response to the illegal presence of law enforcement officers, and
lands within the curtilage, it will be suppressed20
Not only is the question of the physical limits of the curtilage
"somewhat fictional,"8 10 but the very applicability of the doctrine
to the issue of unreasonable conduct is highly questionable. In the
first place, as is also true with "open fields," it is a test for the
gauging of reasonableness that is "predicated upon a common law
concept which has no historical relevance to the Fourth Amend-
ment guaranty."8' Secondly, and most critically, it has the effect
of maximizing property interests, thereby shifting the focal point
of inquiry away from those of personal privacy. 2 Therefore, the
preserved privacy approach should be favored over the area con-
cept, without regard to the issue of public accessibility. This would
mean that personal property, irrespective of its physical relation-
ship to a residence or private sleeping quarters, will be protected,
without regard to its accessibility to the public, if its owner or
possessor seeks to preserve its privacy; the rationale being that
since the fourth amendment protects people, and not places, the
issue of reasonableness should be resolved by assessing the degree
77. See cases cited supra note 76. The concept of privacy extending to the curtilage
evolved from a judicial enlargement of the meaning of "houses" contained in the amend-
ment. Rosencranz v. United States, 356 F.2d 310, 313 (1st Cir. 1966).
78. Fletcher v. Wainwright, 399 F.2d 62, 64 (5th Cir. 1968). Contrast this approach
with the one pertaining to "open fields," where the issue of probable cause is irrelevant.
But see ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, § SS 6.04 (Tent. Draft No. 3,
1970) where the requirement of probable cause to seize "things" located on "open lands"
is advocated.
79. E.g., Hobson v. United States, 226 F.2d 890, 894 (8th Cir. 1955).
80. Fletcher v. Wainwright, 399 F.2d 62, 64 (5th Cir. 1963).
81. Wattenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853, 858 (9th Cir. 1968) (noting that
Blackstone discussed the curtilage in relation to the common law concept of burglary, id.
at 858 n.5).
82. The modem trend is in the opposite direction. E.g., Faubion v. United States,
424 F.2d 437, 440 (10th Cir. 1970); Brett v. United States, 412 F.2d 401, 406 (5th Cir.
1969).
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of privacy a person is seeking to preserve, even in an area accessible
to the public, rather than by defining the scope of the curtilage.8 3
B. Argument and Recommendations
Cases dealing with the issue of abandonment usually involve
a discard of contraband, so that when the retrieve is effected, the
officer will have probable cause to arrest. Additionally, the majority
of instances will arise in public places,8 4 in particular, on side-
walks. Since, however, the individual is moving in a public area,
where the risk of disclosure is potentially harmful, any revealment
made by him should be suspect, absent circumstances clearly
demonstrating its voluntary character.
It is not difficult to imagine the factual context."' An indi-
vidual, while walking down a street, observes a police officer on his
beat. Obviously, the individual knows the nature of the property
he is carrying, as well as the danger posed by any activity that will
arouse the officer's suspicions. Therefore, it behooves him to move
with circumspection, and to avoid any semblance of panic or
furtiveness. 0
At this point he has two options open to him. Either he con-
tinues to proceed with the contraband concealed on his person,
thereby gambling on non-detection, or he opts in favor of a sur-
reptitious discard. As now staged, there is a twofold risk facing
the individual. If he decides against a discard, he is faced with the
danger of exposal through a frisk. If he elects to discard, he runs
the dual risk of retrieval and abandonment.
83. Wattenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 1968), relying upon
Katz. Although the continued vitality of the "curtilage" test is questionable post-Katz,
388 F.2d at 857, 858 n.6, it has been intimated that Katz has no substantial bearing on
the "open fields" doctrine. E.g., United States v. Campbell, 395 F.2d 848, 849 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 834 (1968). Contra, ALI MODEL CODE OV PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PRO-
CEDURE, Commentary on Article 6, at 81 (rent. Draft No. 3, 1970).
84. The reasons for this are apparent. A police officer will not be permitted to con-
duct a warrantless search of private premises, even though he has probable cause to
believe that contraband is situated there. E.g., Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497
(1958); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925); People v. King, 88 Cal. Rptr.
273, 275 (Ct. App., 2d Dist. 1970); People v. Baird, 470 P.2d 20, 24 (Colo. 1970). There-
fore, in a house search, the police will wisely seek, and defend, a seizure on the basis of
a search warrant. Also, the issue of abandonment is more sharply etched in the context
of public activity, where the police do not have to initiaJly justify their presence.
85. For a typical example see State v. Shaw, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 17, 18, 262 A.2d 614,
615 (Tr. Div. 1968).
86. That furtive activity may have a bearing upon probable cause has been recog-
nized. E.g., United States v. Cunningham, 424 F.2d 942, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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The wiser course for him to follow will be to retain the con-
traband on his person and to act in a manner that will minimize
the risk of detention for investigative purposes, which would risk
potential exposure. There are several factors sanctioning this
course of conduct. In the first place, as he continues down the
street, he will walk under the protection of the fourth amend-
ment.8 7 And, secondly, even if he is temporarily detained by the
officer, and frisked for weapons, the discovery of the contraband
will probably be suppressed.88
Until now, the individual has been in full command of the
situation, and all activity has to be judged in terms of his intent.
If he has elected to discard the goods by throwing them away, then
it will be clear that he has decided to abandon them.89 If, however,
he should choose to retain them in his custody, then he will have
freely assumed the risk. In either event, if the discard, or the indi-
vidual's presence, goes unnoticed, the matter will end there.
An entirely different situation will arise if the officer observes
the individual, for here the focus of inquiry will be directed
toward the former's intent as manifested by his reaction to the
latter's presence. If the officer does nothing, or if he simply places
the individual under surveillance, in the belief that he may pos-
sibly witness some criminal activity, then there will be no issue of
unreasonableness. If, however, the officer, without benefit of prob-
able cause, and acting strictly on a "hunch," or because of suspicion
based upon personal knowledge or hearsay, decides to follow the
individual, and proceeds to hound him in a harassing manner,
hoping that the individual will panic in the belief that he had
better "ditch the stuff" before there is a shakedown, then an issue
of major constitutional proportions will arise. Since the individual
cannot possibly know in advance how far the officer will go, he has
no way of gauging a prudent course. If the officer continues to
close in, the individual has to anticipate a search. To do nothing
87. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
88. A frisk for weapons cannot be expanded into a general exploratory search for
evidence of crime. Sibron v. New York, 892 U.S. 40, 65 (1968).
89. See People v. Prisco, 61 Misc. 2d 730, 733, 305 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 1010 (Sup. Ct.
1969). Should he elect to remove them from his person and to select a place for their
temporary concealment, with the purpose of retrieving them later, then it would be
equally clear that he has intended no abandonment. For an example of attempted con-
cealment which, while avoiding abandonment, did expose the individual to the risk of
"open view," see State v. Riddick, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 613, 614, 615-16, 260 A.2d 419, 421-22
(App. Div. 1969).
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means certain discovery. To attempt a discard 0 is to invite a re-
trieve, thereby giving the officer probable cause to arrest.
In this context, then, it is unrealistic to argue justification in
terms of either consciousness of guilt 91 or the "plain view" doc-
trine. 2 Reliance upon consciousness of guilt is particularly unsatis-
factory. In the first place, it would eliminate every reactive discard
from fourth amendment considerations. Secondly, it would accord
the protection of the amendment only to innocent persons, thereby
violating the principle that both the innocent and the guilty fall
within its protective sphere.0 3 However, because of their very inno-
cence, there would be nothing for them to discard. Thus, the issue
of abandonment could never arise in the case of an innocent per-
son, thereby leaving the police free to force a discard from the
guilty and then to deny to them the protection of the amendment
by claiming abandonment on the basis of consciousness of guilt.
Reliance upon "plain view" would also be misplaced, because
it would deny the reality of the situation by overlooking its coercive
atmosphere. Undoubtedly, in a given situation, a discard will make
an object plainly visible, and if it is done voluntarily, no issue of
search will be presented. 94 But this is a far cry from the overween-
ing coerciveness inherent in a situation where a police officer
hounds and harasses an individual into a discard. Such action,
which effectively prompts a reaction, cannot be considered im-
material to the critical issue of intent, nor can it serve to divest the
individual of his right to privacy; for only when exposure is know-
90. Undoubtedly, some individuals will opt in favor of discard, in the mistaken
belief that they will not be prosecuted for a possessory offense if the goods axe not dis-
covered on their persons. For an interesting example of the wisdom of retention, see
Capitoli v. Wainwright, 426 F.2d 868, 869, 870 (5th Cir. 1970), where all the evidence
in a car, except a package thrown from it, was suppressed.
91. See State v. Shaw, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 17, 19, 262 A.2d 614, 615 (Tr. Div. 1968).
See also United States v. Martin, 886 F.2d 213, 215 (Sd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
862 (1968) ; United States v. McKethan, 247 F. Supp. 324, 328 (D.D.C. 1965), affd by order,
No. 20,059 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
92. Under the doctrine, what is in plain view is not the object of a search. E.g.,
Capitoli v. Wainwright, 426 F.2d 868, 870 (5th Cir. 1970); Poore v. Ohio, 243 F. Supp.
777, 784 (N.D. Ohio 1965), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Townsend v. Ohio, 366 F.2d
33 (6th Cir. 1966); People v. Lawson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 729, 732, 81 Cal. Rptr. 883, 884
(1969) ; Hughes v. State, 471 P.2d 245, 247 (Nev. 1970). For the doctrine to apply, the
viewer must be lawfully positioned so as to make his observation. Amador-Gonzalez v.
United States, 391 F.2d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 1968); State v. Miller, 80 N.M. 227, 229, 453
P.2d 590, 592 (1969) ; see Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
93. E.g., Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
94. This will be so on two scores: abandonment and "plain view."
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ingly and intentionally accomplished, may it be considered beyond
the pale of fourth amendment protection 5
Wherever an individual may legitimately be, he carries with
him expectations of privacy with regard to the integrity and dig-
nity of his person.9 This means that he may properly invoke this
protectable right to privacy wherever he may reasonably anticipate
freedom from governmental intrusion .9 7 It is this broad doctrine of
expectation of privacy that is the essence of the decision in Katz
v. United States.98 There, in discarding9 the "trespass" doctrine
announced in Olmstead v. United States,00 and in exalting privacy
over property,'0 the Supreme Court held that wherever the indi-
vidual habors a reasonable expectation of privacy, he is guaranteed
freedom from unreasonable governmental intrusion. 0 2 Thus,
if he walks down a public street, the fourth amendment walks with
him, so as to preserve his body from unreasonable invasion.0 3 And,
if he seeks to preserve as private an item by concealing it upon
his person, he has the right to know that it will also be constitu-
tionally protected. 04 Therefore, the test of reasonableness under
the fourth amendment is not whether there has been a physical
invasion of property, but rather whether there has been an intru-
sion upon one's reasonable expectation of privacy. 0°
95. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
96. State v. Dias, 470 P.2d 510, 514 (Hawaii 1970); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
9 (1968).
97. State v. Matias, 51 Hawaii 62, -, 451 P.2d 257, 259 (1969).
98. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
99. Katz has been so interpreted vis-h-vis Olmstead. E.g., United States v. White,
405 F.2d 838, 843 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 394 U.S. 957 (1969).
100. 277 U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928).
101. "For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
102. Id. at 351, 359.
103. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
104. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
105. People v. Christman, 61 Misc. 2d 1084, 1087, 307 N.Y.S.2d 545, 549 (Monroe
Cty. Ct. 1970); see Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968) (the issue is not one
of property interest in the place invaded, but rather of the individual's reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in the area). The justifiable-expectation-of-privary premise of Katz
has been recognized and followed. E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); United
States v. White, 405 F.2d 838, 846 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 394 U.S. 957 (1969); United
States v. Poole, 307 F. Supp. 1185, 1189 (E.D. La. 1969); People v. Berutko, 71 Cal. 2d
84, 93, 453 P.2d 721, 726, 77 Cal. Rptr. 217, 222 (1969) ; State v. Dias, 470 P.2d 510, 514
(Hawaii 1970); Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa. Super. 177, -, 263 A.2d 904, 907
(1970).
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There is no meaningful distinction of constitutional signifi-
cance between unreasonable search and seizure activity, and harass-
ing official conduct outside the legitimate investigative sphere
which prompts an individual to reveal what would otherwise be
impermissible for the police to seek by means of a search of his
person. In short, the police may not do indirectly what is denied to
them directly. In either event, they will be engaging in conduct
equally unreasonable under the fourth amendment, which, ap-
parently, has been recognized by both the Supreme Court and
several lower courts. 0 6 If a question,10 7 an observation,1 08 or an act
of hearing, 0 9 can each be considered part of the search process,
there seems little reason why the same reasoning may not equally
apply to harassing police conduct that seeks to prompt the victim
into revealing what would otherwise be the product of an un-
reasonable search and seizure if conducted by the officer. There-
fore, if overbearing conduct outside the realm of legitimate in-
vestigation falls beyond the pale of the fourth amendment, any
attempt to exploit it'by retrieving its fruits for subsequent use in
a criminal prosecution should be condemned and suppressed
under the same authority."0
106. For example, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the court, while endorsing
a temporary detention for legitimate investigative purposes, and a limited patting of
outer garments for concealed weapons, sounded a warning to the police to reasonably
limit their on-the-street activities to "the legitimate investigative sphere." Id. at 15. As
the court admonished:
Nothing we say today is to be taken as indicating approval of police conduct
outside the legitimate investigative sphere. Under our decision, courts still retain
their traditional responsibility to guard against police conduct which is over-
bearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal security without the
objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution requires. When such
conduct is identified, it must be condemned by the judiciary and its fruits must
be excluded from evidence in criminal trials.
Id. (emphasis added). And, in People v. Bridges, 123 I1. App. 2d 58, 259 N.E.2d 626
(4th Dist. 1970), the court inferentially acknowledged that if police officers, by means
of provocation, force an individual to drop, discard, or reveal either contraband or
other incriminating evidence, its seizure will be unreasonable. Id. at -, 259 N.E. 2d at
630 (dictum by implication); see authorities cited supra note 39.
107. People v. Whitehurst, 25 N.Y.2d 389, 392, 254 N.E.2d 905, 906, 306 N.Y.S. 2d
673, 675 (1969).
108. Williams v. United States, 263 F.2d 487, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1959); People v.
Terrell, 53 Misc. 2d 32, 40, 277 N.Y.S.2d 926, 935 (Sup. Ct. 1967); People v. Kramer, 38
Misc. 2d 889, 892, 239 N.Y.S.2d 303, 307 (App. T. 1963); see Kirby v. Superior Court, 87
Cal. Rptr. 577, 579 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
109. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352, 353 (1967).
110. Although a cogent argument can also be made for suppression under the
privilege against self-incrimination, that privilege broadly applies to only testimonial
communications, either in oral or documentary form. E.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
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It must be acknowledged, however, that it will not always be
an easy matter for a court to clearly detect, or identify, such harass-
ment; but this should never deter it from its duty to inquire when-
ever the issue is properly raised. Most likely a denial will be forth-
coming from the police, and the court will be faced with the always
vexing question of credibility. To believe the accused is to set
him free; to disbelieve him is to sanction what might, in truth, be
unconstitutional behavior.
In resolving this problem of credibility, a court would do
well to guide itself by a common sense approach, and not blind
itself to the realities of the situation.11' In the first place, the
incident may not have been the first of its kind between the
accused and the officer, or the police in general. 1 2 Rather than
limit its interpretation of the victim's reaction to consciousness of
guilt, the court would be prudent if it gave equal attention to the
possibility of prior similar instances of police harassment of the
accused."13 If such incidents are brought to light, especially those
involving actual shakedowns, it will go a long way toward estab-
lishing the reasonableness of the victim's fears, and militating
against consciousness of guilt. Secondly, the court should pay due
consideration to the unnatural behavior being attributed to the
victim by the arresting officer in his testimony at the suppression
hearing. Is it normal for a person to incriminate himself by vol-
untarily exposing to a police officer contraband he has previously
263, 266 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967); Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia, 384 U.S. 757, 761, 763-64 (1966); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53
(1910); 8 WIGMOPE EVMENCE § 2264, at 363-64 (3d ed. 1940). Thus, the scope of the
privilege has not been given the full application which the values it helps to protect
might suggest. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 762 (1966).
111. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter admonished:
[T]here comes a point where this Court should not be ignorant as judges of
what we know as men.
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949).
112. See State v. Shaw, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 17, 262 A.2d 614 (Tr. Div. 1968), wherein
the officer recognized defendant from previous criminal involvement. Id. at 18, 262 A.2d
at 614. This, undoubtedly, was a factor in the officer's decision to follow him. See Capitoli
v. Wainwright, 426 F.2d 868, 869 (5th Cir. 1970).
113. This would be an area. that could be best explored by defense counsel through
the testimony of his client establishing specific dates and locales for such encounters. That
law enforcement officers engage in illegal activity under the fourth amendment has been
judicially acknowledged. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson); see Irvine v. California 347 U.S. 128, 137 (1954).
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taken pains to conceal? 14 Although such testimony is certainly not
beyond the realm of credibility, a court should subject it to very
careful analysis before attaching credence to it."15 Finally, the
court should attach critical importance to the officer's motives.
What prompted him? What aroused his suspicions?" 6 What was
he seeking? What motivated him? What was he trying to accom-
plish? These are the questions that must be raised, and answered,
before the factual issue of reasonableness can be properly re-
solved. 7
In making this determination, however, the court should
divorce itself from any consideration of property rights and in-
terests in either the locus of the discard or the area of the retrieve.
The ultimate focale points of inquiry must be the manner of
intrusion into the individual's zone of privacy, and its motivating
purpose.
114. For example, in the situation involving search-by-consent, it has been recog-
nized that the certainty of incrimination is a factor militating against voluntariness.
But no sane man who denies his guilt would actually be willing that policemen
search his room for contraband which is certain to be discovered. It follows that
when police identify themselves as such, search a room, and find contraband
in it, the occupant's words or signs of acquiescence in the search, accompanied
by a denial of guilt do not show consent; at least in the absence of some extra-
ordinary circumstance such as ignorance that contraband is present.
Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
115. The factors to be considered here are consciousness of guilt, motivating and
prompting a voluntary discard, and a truly genuine intent to abandon.
116. It must be kept in mind that in the situation presented, the officer will be
functioning or operating without benefit of probable cause; for, otherwise, he would have
a constitutional basis for his actions, and would not have to seek justification in either
abandonment or under the "plain view" doctrine.
117. Since the court can anticipate self-serving responses from the officer, it should
be prepared to analyze them in the context of the abnormal behavior pattern being
attributed to the accused.

